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DEMOCRACY’S “DOUBLES”
Ivan Krastev
The era of liberal ascendancy that began in 1989 has now come to an
end. The world structured by the clear-cut opposition between democ-
racy and autocracy is no longer the world in which we live. In this new
period the most obvious danger comes from radical Islam, but a more
potent threat to freedom is posed by the rise of democracy’s “doubles”—
regimes that claim to be democratic and may look like democracies, but
which rule like autocracies.1 Liberal democracy today is challenged on
one side by Hugo Chávez’s revolutionary Venezuela and on the other
by Vladimir Putin’s antirevolutionary Russia. Yet while self-styled “di-
rect democracy” in Venezuela and “directed democracy” in Russia may
appear in some ways to be polar opposites, they also share a profound
kinship.
A key to understanding the commonality between them is provided
by Cas Mudde in a fascinating article on populism. Mudde argues that
populism “considers society to be ultimately separated into two ho-
mogenous and antagonistic groups”—the people and the elite.
“Populism, so defined,” he adds, “has two opposites: elitism and plural-
ism. Elitism is populism’s mirror image. . . . Pluralism, on the other
hand, rejects the homogeneity of both populism and elitism, seeing
society as a heterogeneous collection of groups and individuals with
often fundamentally different views and wishes.”2 In this light, we can
see that Venezuelan populism and Russian elitism are opposite sides of
the same coin. Both represent a rebellion against the pluralistic charac-
ter of democratic societies and democratic politics, against democracy
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understood as the representation of diverse interests. Chávez’s popu-
lism and Putin’s directed, or “managed,” democracy share the same
reductionist view of modern politics as a clash between “people power”
and the manipulative power of the elites (though Chávez claims to
express the sentiments of “the people,” while Russia relies on elite
manipulation to keep in check the dangerous and self-destructive
people). It is this antipluralist vision of society and politics that has
propelled the rise of democracy’s doubles.
In Venezuela, as Javier Corrales puts it, Chávez “has virtually elimi-
nated the contradiction between autocracy and political competitive-
ness.”3 Having discovered that he can concentrate power more easily in
the context of a strident opposition than of a banned opposition, he has
refashioned authoritarianism for a democratic age. His strategy is to at-
tack political parties, to polarize society, to spread the wealth selec-
tively, to foster the decline of bureaucracy, to encourage a dysfunctional
state, and constantly to change the rules of the game. Chávez practices
democracy as a regime of controlled chaos, and by antagonizing the U.S.
hyperpower he gains a source of domestic and international legitimacy.
In Russia, liberal democracy’s other double, elites use managed de-
mocracy to prevent the genuine representation of the angry majority
who see themselves as losers in the transition away from communism.
These elites deploy such institutional elements of democracy as politi-
cal parties, elections, and diverse media for the sole purpose of helping
those in power to stay in power. Elections are held regularly, but they
do not provide an opportunity to transfer power, only to legitimize it.
Russia does not have a traditional hegemonic party like the Mexican
PRI to manage its managed democracy. Instead, the key to the system is
the creation of a parallel political reality. The Russian project of “de-
mocracy without representation” perfectly fits the mold of what
communist propaganda used to describe as “façade democracy.” The
goal is “not only to establish a monopoly of power but also to monopo-
lize the competition for it.”4
Chávez’s strategy is to encourage maximum confrontation and po-
litical mobilization; the Kremlin’s strategy is to encourage maximum
confusion and political demobilization. Democracy’s doubles present
themselves not as alternatives to democracy but as embodiments of real
democracy. Both Chávez and Putin are masters at employing demo-
cratic rhetoric to achieve their political goals; both enjoy popular
backing in national opinion polls as well as considerable support out-
side their own countries. Both of them are now in the business of exporting
their brand of “democracy”; each spends millions of petrodollars, masked
as assistance to like-minded “democrats,” to promote his regional ambi-
tions. Both are adroit in using the appeal of anti-Americanism in the
world. Each of them heads a regime that in some ways resembles democ-
racy, but in both cases the reality is a near-total monopoly of power.
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In his famous 1997 Foreign Affairs essay “The Rise of Illiberal De-
mocracy,” Fareed Zakaria warned that, as the global wave of democrati-
zation spilled into previously undemocratic terrain, unbridled
majoritarianism might ride roughshod over constitutionalism and the
rule of law. In making this claim, he echoed the worries of other observ-
ers that the spread of popularly elected governments often was not be-
ing accompanied by the spread of freedom. But Zakaria’s interpretation
of the rise of illiberal democracy as a victory of electoral majoritarianism
over liberal constitutionalism fails to explain the diversity of the
pseudodemocratic regimes that have emerged. The rise of unrestrained
majoritarianism may help to explain “the Chávez phenomenon,” with
its claim to express the general will of the people, but it is of no help at
all in understanding the political regime in Russia. For Russia’s man-
aged democracy is anything but “the tyranny of the majority.”
According to Zakaria’s interpretation, illiberal democracy, the un-
happy offspring of the marriage between the new global imperative of
democratization and local illiberal traditions, has arisen as an unin-
tended consequence of the worldwide democratic revolution. This is
not the case with democracy’s doubles, however. Russia is not an illib-
eral democracy by default; it is an illiberal democracy by design. The
rise of democracy’s doubles cannot be explained by an inability or un-
willingness to reconcile the democratic principle and the liberal prin-
ciple, or by misguided external pressure to democratize. Such regimes
are characterized not by the clash between democratic majoritarianism
and constitutional liberalism, but by the “instrumentalization” of demo-
cratic institutions. Democracy’s doubles can best be understood as an
attempt to construct political regimes that mimic democratic institu-
tions but work outside the logic of political representation and seek to
repress any trace of genuine political pluralism. Chávez’s democradura
and Russia’s managed democracy should be understood as conscious
projects—projects that have considerable attraction and are likely to be
replicated elsewhere. The ground has been prepared for them by the rise
of populist politics under conditions of declining sovereignty and state
weakness.
For the most part, the illiberal regimes in Venezuela and Russia are
analyzed primarily in terms of the policies and personalities of their
leaders, Chávez and Putin respectively. While this kind of analysis may
be partially justified in the case of Venezuela, it is surely inadequate as
regards Russia. Managed democracy as a political project and as a po-
litical practice did not start with Putin. It was already in place during
Boris Yeltsin’s second term (1996–2000). Putin was not the inventor of
managed democracy in Russia, though he has been its principal benefi-
ciary. The key to understanding Russian politics today is not to be
found in Putin’s personal background or popularity, or in the rise of his
fellow siloviki (officials who began their careers in the old Soviet coer-
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cive apparatus). I believe Russia’s political system can best be grasped
by looking at the country’s “political technologists,” the Kremlin’s
infamous grand masters of manipulation. Just as the Soviet regime could
not be properly understood without reference to communist ideology,
managed democracy today cannot be grasped without reference to the
political technologists and their view of democracy and politics.
If I were to choose the two major protagonists of the new antidemo-
cratic politics, I would put alongside Hugo Chávez not Vladimir Putin
but Gleb Pavlovsky, Russia’s premier political technologist. Admittedly,
Pavlovsky and Chávez make a strange pair. The latter is a passionate
former army officer, with a talent for expressing public sentiments, who
loves elections even more than coups and spends his free time running a
television show. He speaks the language of the left, appeals to the
underclass, and has inspired a new generation of populist revolutions.
He has made himself the symbol of “people power.” Pavlovsky, by con-
trast, is an intellectual with a talent for manipulation and political
engineering. Far from loving crowds, he fears them—though he also re-
cently started a TV talk show. These two men—Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s
populist president, and Gleb Pavlovsky, Russia’s ultimate political ma-
nipulator—best symbolize the major challenge to democracy today. They
are freedom’s enemies from within both democratic discourse and the
institutional framework of democracy. The ex-colonel and the political
technologist are the faces of the antiliberal doubles of democracy.
Democracy According to the Political Technologists
In a Kremlin world dominated by mediocre apparatchiks, KGB offic-
ers, and ruthless oligarchs, the political technologists might look like
people from another planet. They come from the milieu of the intelli-
gentsia and the world of alternative culture. Gleb Pavlovsky is a policy
intellectual and a former dissident who was persecuted in Soviet times
for his “reformist delusions.” Marat Gelman is an extremely successful
art-collector and gallery owner and one of the gurus of the Moscow arts
community. Sergei Markov is an internationally respected academic.
They all have the biographies of typical Russian Westernizers. Pavlovsky
worked with George Soros and his Open Society Institute in the early
1990s and briefly acted as editor of a Russian version of the Journal of
Democracy. Markov was a fellow in the Moscow office of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and coauthored a book with Michael
McFaul. Gelman was a favorite source for Western journalists working
in Moscow. They were Russia’s liberals. In the early 1990s, they pro-
claimed their belief in free and fair elections, limited government,
democratic pluralism, and independent media. Today, however, they
have all become “political technologists.”
In his scandalous political thriller The Politologist, written in the
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best tradition of conspiratorial realism, Alexander Prohanov, a leader of
Russia’s patriotic opposition, gives us the most sinister and at the same
time most profound psychological portrait of the Russian political tech-
nologist. He is a creature from hell: cynical, disloyal, ambitious, and
greedy. He is highly creative and deceptive at the same time. He is the
hostage of his ambition to manipulate others. He is the consummate
social engineer, but also a tool of Kremlin politics. He is a tragic fig-
ure—confused, scared, and insecure. In his own view, the political
technologist is the savior of democracy in Russia; in the view of others,
he is its gravedigger.
In Moscow, the way you define the meaning of “political technolo-
gist” is a significant indicator of your political positions and moral
taste: “Political technologist” can mean a policy analyst or political
consultant; it can mean an expert in “black PR” or in contaminating the
political environment; it can mean a Kremlin insider or political provo-
cateur. Contrary to the common view of the Western media, “political
technologist” is not simply the Russian term for “spin doctor.” What
makes political technologists a different species from the other election
strategists or PR consultants who have populated the strange world of
Russian politics is their direct or indirect connection to the Kremlin.
The Russian political technologist resembles a Western political con-
sultant in the way that the electric chair resembles an armchair.
Political consultants in the West (however low one’s opinion of them)
work with independent media, and their trade is influencing these me-
dia. Political technologists are experts in manipulating dependent media.
Political consultants in the West are experts at winning votes for their
candidates; political technologists are also specialists in winning votes,
but they take matters one step further—they are also specialists in “cre-
ative counting” of the votes. A political consultant works for one of the
parties in an election and does his best to help that party win; the politi-
cal technologist is not interested in the victory of his party but in the
victory of “the system.” His goal is not to maximize the vote for his
client, but to obtain an election result as close as possible to the percent-
age of the vote that the Kremlin has planned for his client.
In other words, political technologists are those in charge of main-
taining the illusion of competitiveness in Russian politics. As Andrew
Wilson puts it, “Post-Soviet political technologists . . . see themselves
as political metaprogrammers, system designers, decision-makers and
controllers all in one, applying whatever technology they can to the
construction of politics as a whole.”5 Their role in Russian politics re-
calls that of Gosplan in the Soviet economy. They are the ideologues
and the symbol of Russian managed democracy. They operate in a “world
of ‘clones’ and ‘doubles’; of ‘administrative resources,’ ‘active mea-
sures,’ and ‘kompromat’ [compromising information]; of parties that
stand in elections but have no staff or membership or office . . . of well-
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paid insiders that stand as the regime’s most vociferous opponents; and
of scarecrow nationalists and fake coups.”6 Political technologists are
the principal enemy of democratic pluralism.
Political technologists play several different institutional roles at
one and the same time. They run think tanks and speak as experts on
behalf of the public good.7 They are also consultants who speak the
language of business and deny any political affiliation with their vari-
ous clients; this does not prevent them, however, from also presenting
themselves as independent political commentators who interpret for the
public what is going on in Russian and global politics. When it be-
comes necessary, the political technologist, as a sacrifice of last resort,
is even ready to take a public job. In 2003, just before the parliamentary
elections, Marat Gelman was appointed as deputy director of the public
television station ORT-Russia to help ensure that political parties would
gain the electoral results that were planned for them. In the wake of the
Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Modest Kolerov, Pavlovsky’s deputy at
the Center for Effective Policies, joined the presidential administration
as head of the new “anti-Orange” department dealing with the post-
Soviet republics. The political technologist can be found everywhere
in the policy process, performing all kinds of jobs. In his role as “gray
cardinal,” Pavlovsky urged the Kremlin to adopt new legislation that
would create a body known as the Public Chamber in order to control
Russia’s NGOs. In his role as a policy expert he supported the move, and
then in his role as an independent political commentator he explained
to the public what a wonderful policy the Kremlin had initiated. The
circle was closed.
Those who question the real importance of political technologists,
contending that they are less influential in Kremlin decision making
than the siloviki or the in-house oligarchs, fail to recognize that the
political technologists’ impact is greatest in framing political issues
and not in lobbying for concrete policies. In this sense, the political
technologists can be analyzed as a collective player in Russian politics,
despite the fact that in real life political technologists constantly com-
pete with and often passionately hate one another. It is their shared
view of the nature and the goals of current Russian politics that makes
the political technologists so revealing with regard to the nature of the
political regime in Moscow. Their interest is the interest of the system.
Manipulating the Media
The type of political regime that governs Russia today would have
been unthinkable in the pre-television age. The art of the political tech-
nologists lies in replacing the political representation of values, interests,
and ideas that is at the heart of liberal democracy with the media repre-
sentation of a nonexisting political reality that is at the core of managed
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democracy. Their ideology is a Molotov cocktail of French postmodernism
and KGB instrumentalism. What the political technologists have bor-
rowed from the postmodernists is their intuition of “the unreality of
reality.” What they borrowed from the rich tradition of the Soviet secret
police were the technologies that can make
the unreal real. The role of television and
media manipulation in establishing man-
aged democracy in the post-Soviet states
is perhaps best captured by a poster that
one Ukrainian youth carried in the streets
of Kiev during the Orange Revolution in
late 2004. The poster read: “Kill the TV in
yourself.”
A common thread in the otherwise
diverse ideological views of people like
Gleb Pavlovsky, Marat Gelman, and Sergei Markov is their militant
antirevolutionism and their self-proclaimed break with the traditional
politics of the Russian intelligentsia. In Pavlovsky’s words, “Our posi-
tion on revolution is simple: no revolutions and no encouragement of
revolutions.”7 The demonstrative cynicism of the political technolo-
gists is intended as a direct challenge to the idealism of the Russian
revolutionary intelligentsia at the beginning of the last century. Their
open ambition for money and status is the opposite of the culture of
self-sacrifice and the attachment to nonmaterial values of the old Rus-
sian intelligentsia. Their project of excluding the people from political
life runs directly contrary to the old intelligentsia’s mission of giving
power to the people.
The political technologists believe that their mission is to save de-
mocracy from the antidemocratic impulse of those on top and from the
populist egalitarianism and communist nostalgia of those below. For
them the government is the only real liberal force in Russia. In their
eyes, “Liberal democracy is nothing more than a mechanism of elite
control through the use of elections, parties . . . and most importantly,
‘the independent media.’”8 They have fashioned themselves as the
postliberal postintelligentsia.
In 1999, determined to stop the Communists and their allies—Moscow
mayor Yuri Luzhkov and then-premier Yevgeny Primakov—from com-
ing to power, the political technologists served as the major instrument
for the Yeltsin “family” in securing the presidential succession in Mos-
cow. They counseled the appointed crown prince Vladimir Putin to
organize a small victorious war in Chechnya, and they advised Boris
Yeltsin to step down in favor of Putin before the end of his presidential
term. In the course of the 1999 parliamentary elections, they succeeded in
destroying the presidential ambitions and political chances of the still-
popular Primakov in less than a month with a “campaign” based on
The political technolo-
gists’ ideology is a
Molotov cocktail of
French postmodernism
and KGB-inspired
instrumentalism.
Ivan Krastev 59
kompromat and blackmail. During the 2003 parliamentary elections they
came up with the project of creating a nationalistic and openly anti-
Semitic party (Motherland) in order to prevent the nationalist vote from
going to the Communists. In the same 2003 parliamentary elections, as
Andrew Wilson notes, the political technologists also backed “the Agrar-
ians, the Party of Russia’s Rebirth, the New Communist Party, and a handful
of left-nationalist parties like Rus and the Eurasia Union. A fly-storm can
take a large collective bite; and the communist vote duly dropped from
24.3 percent in 1999 to 12.7 percent four years later.”9 The political tech-
nologists’ strategy might be dubbed “preventive representation.”
Now, on the eve of the 2007 parliamentary elections, the political
technologists are back in the laboratory. They passionately disagree
over whether the Kremlin should go into these elections represented by
one, two, or three parties and over who should be anointed as the head
of the opposition. Their ultimate goal, of course, is to arrange the suc-
cession that will take place during the presidential election in 2008.
In hindsight, two events appear to have been critical in shaping the
emergence of Russia’s managed democracy: Yeltsin’s bombardment of
the Russian parliament building in October 1993 and his victory in the
presidential election of June 1996. The attack on parliament convinced
the elites of the undesirability and limited effectiveness of violence.
The reelection campaign convinced them of the power and effective-
ness of manipulation. Managed democracy was justified as the best way
to prevent a communist restoration. For this reason, it appealed not only
to some Russian liberals but also to Western governments, whose great-
est fear was that Yeltsin would be defeated by the Communists. The
establishment of managed democracy in Russia would never have been
possible without the endorsement of the West. It was the decision of
Western governments to endorse Yeltsin and not to insist on fair elec-
tions that brought to life the current regime in Russia.
In its social origins, managed democracy reflected the strange rela-
tions between the rulers and the ruled in Yeltsin’s Russia. As Stephen
Holmes has insightfully portrayed this relationship, “Those at the top
neither exploit nor oppress those at the bottom. They do not even gov-
ern them; they simply ignore them.”10 Managed democracy is a political
regime that liberates the elites from the necessity of governing and
gives them time to take care of their personal business. It was perceived
as the best instrument for avoiding a bloody revolution; at the same
time, it created room for “the criminal revolution” that transferred much
of the nation’s wealth into the hands of few powerful insiders. It was the
most suitable regime for a “nontaxing state.” When government taxes
people, it has to provide benefits in return, beginning with services,
accountability, and good governance, but ending with liberty and rep-
resentation.
This reciprocal exchange between taxation and representation is what
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gives government legitimacy in the modern world. Russia’s managed
democracy succeeded in perverting this logic. There were taxes in Rus-
sia, but nobody really cared to collect them; there were elections, but
they were not allowed to represent real interests. Postcommunist elites
discovered the irresistible charm of state weakness. Russia was a weak
state, but it was also a cunning state, one that was quite selective in its
weakness. It failed to pay the salaries of workers, but was strong enough
to redistribute property and even to repay foreign debts when this was
in the interests of the elites. The regime’s strategy was to keep up the
illusion of political representation while at the same time preventing
the interests and sentiments of the transition’s losers from being repre-
sented. Managed democracy made the elites totally independent of
citizens’ legitimate claims. None of the reforms implemented in Russia
in the heyday of managed democracy was initiated by pressure from
below. It is this total disregard for the basic needs of the people that
constitutes the most vulnerable spot of Russia’s managed democracy.
And it is not by accident that Putin’s response to the Orange Revolution
in Ukraine was a return to classic Soviet measures—more repression but
also more social care and state paternalism.
The World of the Doubles
The political technologists and their project look as typically Rus-
sian as a cold winter, a bottle of vodka, or a game of Russian roulette.
Chávez and his revolution look as typically Latin American as a mili-
tary coup, Che Guevara, or a Mexican soap opera. But these impressions
are misleading in both cases. The rise of managed democracy is a trend
that extends beyond the post-Soviet world; hence it cannot be explained
simply by the peculiarities of Russian political culture. The broader
appeal of managed democracy is due to several other factors present in
many parts of the globe: the status of democracy and elections as the
only acceptable source of legitimacy in the modern world; the increas-
ing costs of violence as an instrument for preserving power; the widening
gap between elected officials and voting publics; the rise of the virtual
world of TV and the Internet; and the de-ideologization of modern poli-
tics. In the context of rising populist pressures from below, political
elites in different parts of the world, anxious to secure their positions,
find it attractive to establish managed democracies based on soft repres-
sion and hard manipulation.
Similarly, the rise of populist revolutions is not a strictly Latin Ameri-
can phenomenon. The “color revolutions” that have swept some of the
post-Soviet republics in the last few years are not so different in their
social origins and political claims from the leftist electoral revolutions
in Latin America. The color revolutions expressed a strong desire for
change, but not necessarily a desire for more democracy, let alone more
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capitalism. The people on the streets of Kiev, unlike the people on the
streets of Central Europe in 1989 (but like populist voters in Latin
America today) were asking for a revision of privatization, not for more
privatization. The color revolutions marked the collapse of post-Soviet
hybrid regimes, but it is not clear if they mark the emergence of a new
democratic wave in Eurasia. Democratic ideas played only a limited
role in mobilizing support for the color revolutions, whose victors won
power as opposition movements rather than as democratic movements.
As Michael McFaul has observed, their “main message was a cry of
‘Enough!’ hurled in the face of the incumbent powerholders.”11
Surprisingly, the similarities between Eurasia’s color revolutions and
the recent dramatic changes in Latin America have remained largely
unnoticed. Observers have been blinded by the fact that the Orange
Revolution was led by a free-market liberal like Yuschenko, while Latin
America’s electoral revolutions have been led by leftists sympathetic to
Fidel Castro. The similarities between Ukraine and Latin America were
also obscured by the fact that anti-elite rhetoric in Ukraine spoke with
anti-Russian accents, while Latin American anti-elitism speaks the lan-
guage of anti-Americanism.
It has turned out that the blurring of the old clash between left and
right, far from leading to an advance of democracy, is threatening its
future. The ultimate manifestation of the new threat to democracy is the
corruption-centered discourse on politics. This discourse moralizes
policy debate to the point where politics is reduced to a choice between
the corrupt government and not-yet-corrupt opposition. The core of
political discourse becomes claims not about the future but about fraud.
Ukrainian voters in the days of the Orange Revolution contested the
fraudulent elections and took to the streets. The angry electorates in
Latin America protest not only against the neoliberals and their poli-
cies but much more against the fraud and the “violin politics” of the
establishment. (Governing in Latin America during the last decade and
a half was like playing a violin: You hold the violin with your left hand,
but you play it with your right one—that is, you win office on a radical
platform, but you govern as a moderate.)
The distinctive feature of the new politics is that the new populist
majorities do not have a clear project for transforming society. They are
inspired not so much by hope as by the sense of betrayal. They are
moralistic, not programmatic. They represent the crisis of traditional
political identities. In their view, social and political change is possible
only through a total change of the elite. The absence of new ideas and of
a new vision for the social world has resulted in rising pressure to put
new people in power. The war cry of the new protest politics is Chávez’s
electoral slogan: “Get rid of them all!”
The response of people in power to the rise of “people power” has
been the politics of total manipulation. The emptiness of the populist
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message makes it impossible to argue against. The sense that democ-
racy entails the representation of diverse ideas and interests is in danger
of being lost. Chávez’s “direct democracy” and Russia’s “directed de-
mocracy” pose a clear challenge to the political pluralism that is central
to liberal democracy. The deficit of political pluralism is the hallmark
of democracy’s doubles. The populist leader and the political technolo-
gist are the twin embodiments of the major threat to liberal democracy
today.
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